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REGIONAL DISTORTIONS IN NATURAL GAS
ALLOCATIONS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
JEFFREY L. HARRISONt AND JOHN P. FORMBYt
All students of economics are taught that a government controlled
ceiling price set below the market clearing price will generate an excess
of demand relative to supply.' When a ceiling price is established, price
ceases to perform as a rationing mechanism and some means of ad-
ministering the regulation-induced shortage must be developed. The
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M.B.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1970, The University of Florida; J.D. 1977, The University of North Carolina.
t Professor and Head, Department of Economics, The University of North Carolina at
Greensboro; B.A. 1962, Colorado College; Ph.D. 1965, The University of Colorado.
1. The traditional model is as follows: D in the graph below shows the quantities (Q) that
consumers are willing and able to purchase at each price (P). Curve S shows the quantities avail-
able for sale at each price. At price P1 the quantity demanded is equal to that supplied (QE). At
price P2 (the ceiling price) the quantity demand (QD) exceeds that supplied (Qs). This is an
excess of demand relative to supply. In the graph this shortage is measured by QD-QS. Only at
price PI is the market cleared. At this price the voluntary decisions of buyers are exactly matched
by those of sellers and quantity demanded and quantity supplied are equal.
Qs Q.
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regulation of natural gas has followed this predictable sequence2 of
events. The regulation of the field price3 of natural gas began in 1954
with the United States Supreme Court decision in Ph.ilips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin.4 Ceiling prices were first set in 1965.1 Until 1970
shortages resulting from the use of ceiling prices were relatively mild.6
By the early 1970's, however, the shortages predicted by elementary
economic models began to appear.7 The regulatory response has been
two-fold. First, the Federal Power Commission (FPC)8 has permitted
the price to rise-but never to the market clearing level.9 Second, the
emergence of serious shortages has been met with the imposition of
curtailment policies' 0 having the somewhat contradictory goals of allo-
cating natural gas into its highest valued use and distributing available
gas supplies in a fair and equitable manner."
The predicted shortage that developed as a result of the imposition
of ceiling prices on the field price of natural gas has been well docu-
mented. 12 Regulation of this type is also generally accompanied by un-
intended and difficult-to-predict consequences that may be as
undesirable as and more troublesome than the shortage itself. For ex-
ample, the continuation of World War II rent ceilings in the New York
2. Deregulation of natural gas prices in some form seems destined to be a part of any com-
prehensive energy policy. Legislative maneuvering suggests, however, that this "deregulation" is
not likely to be complete. A deregulation bill whose passage seemed imminent as of this writing
will not apply to all gas, may be temporary, will entail the regulation of currently unregulated gas
and, in any case, will not take complete effect for several years. See Prospectsfor Energy Bill
Brighten but Tough Fights Still Seen Ahead, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
3. The field price refers to the price paid to gas producers at the wellhead. The principal
buyers at this stage of the natural gas industry are interstate pipeline companies.
4. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
5. Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965).
6. In reality shortages probably did begin to appear soon after price ceilings were imposed.
MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage o/Natural Gas, 14 J.L. & ECON. 167 (1971). Ac-
cording to MacAvoy, the relative mildness of these early shortages was probably due to the small
response of demand and supply to the ceiling prices. Id. at 168.
7. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 941, 965 (1973).
8. Effective October 1, 1977, the duties of the FPC were assigned to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
9. See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 111-40 infra.
11. The goals of equity and efficiency often conflict in setting economic policy. For exam-
ple, if all potential users bid for scarce natural gas, then those who place the highest economic
value on gas will receive it. Gas might end up being used as a boiler fuel and individual home
owners may receive less than what could be perceived as a fair share of the available gas. The
"equity versus efficiency" problem permeates economic policy. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 1-5 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 7.
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housing market led apartment owners to systematically neglect mainte-
nance and upkeep. The unintended result of the rent ceiling was a
severe deterioration in the quality of housing with disastrous long-run
consequences.13 Similarly, regulation of new drug applications by the
Food and Drug Administration under the 1962 amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 4 probably contributed to a significant
decline in innovation in the drug industry, which in turn has led to long
and possibly unnecessary delays in the introduction of therapeutic and
life-saving drugs.'5 The regulation of natural gas has also generated
unforeseen and unintended consequences, the most important of which
are serious regional distortions in natural gas prices and availabilities.
These distortions can create unemployment, raise production costs, in-
crease reliance on imported energy sources, and influence patterns of
regional economic growth. As the data presented below indicate, the
Southeast and, in particular, the Carolinas have been the most disad-
vantaged by these distortions.
The unintended consequences flow directly from the establishment
of price ceilings and attempts to administer the resultant shortage. A
number of economic and legal factors have intermingled to create the
current predicament. In order to understand fully the nature of the
problem, these factors must first be untangled. It is to the task of un-
tangling that the first sections of this article are devoted, while the latter
sections expand on the dangers inherent in the current regulatory
scheme.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF THE
INDUSTRY
A. Industry Structure
There are three stages of productive activity in the natural gas
industry. At the exploration and production stage there are thousands
of gas producers. 6 The gas comes from one of two sources. The first,
13. Moorhouse, OptimalHousing Maintenance Under Rent Control , 39 S. ECON. J. 93, 101
(1972).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
15. S. PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 81-82 (1974).
16. Since crude oil and natural gas are, in part, joint products, the exact number of produc-
ers is somewhat difficult to determine. One recent study suggests that there are approximately
30,000 oil and gas producers. This includes thousands of small gas producers selling only in
intrastate markets. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, NATU-
RAL GAS DEREGULATION LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 13, 93D CONG. 15 (1973).
Perhaps a more reliable indicator of the number of major sellers is provided by a 1970 study by
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dissolved natural gas, is associated with oil production and is
essentially a joint product with crude oil. The second source is nonas-
sociated gas.' 7 In terms of searching for new oil and gas the distinction
between associated and nonassociated is somewhat clouded by the in-
ability of producers in most cases to know what will be discovered by
exploratory drilling. New natural gas reserves from either source will
remain available for some time but can be obtained by producers only
at higher and higher costs.' 8 The primary determinants of the critically
important new gas reserves are the price of gas on new contracts at the
wellhead, the costs of exploration and development, and expected fu-
ture wellhead prices.
Transmission is the second stage of the natural gas industry. The
interstate natural gas pipelines purchase gas at the wellhead, transport
it to consuming regions and sell it to local distributors. There are a total
of 106 regulated interstate pipelines. Thirty-three of these, branching
out into all sections of the country, are designated as major pipelines. 19
There is a strong element of natural monopoly20 in natural gas trans-
mission by pipeline, the origins of which are the enormous economies
of scale associated with the size (diameter) of a pipeline.2' This natural
monopoly position, however, is not complete for two reasons. First,
substitutes for natural gas are available, albeit somewhat imperfect
ones.2 2 Second, the density of population and the industrial structure of
regional economies have made it economically feasible and profitable
to construct two or more pipelines into some areas. As a result, some
states are not served by a major pipeline at all (for example, Maine);
other states are served by only one (for example, North Carolina);
others are served by two (for example, Georgia); and still others are
the FPC of gas producers selling to interstate pipelines; according to this study there were 3,738
producers selling in the interstate market. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, SALES BY PRODUCERS
OF NATURAL GAS TO INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES 1970, at vi (1972).
17. Hausman, Project Independence Report: AnAppraisal of U.S. Energy Needs up to 1985, 6
BELL J. ECON. 517, 529 (1975).
18. See note 33 infra.
19. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 15.
20. A natural monopoly is defined as an economic situation in which the long-run unit costs
of production continuously decline as output expands. In technical economic terms, the econo-
mies of scale in production are inexhaustible. As a consequence, a single business firm is the most
efficient means of producing the needed output. A free market would tend to result in a single
seller in the industry; hence, a natural monopoly is said to exist.
21. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, JR., PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 174-78 (1964).
22. The substitutability of other fuels for natural gas depends on technological factors and
the amount of time available to energy consumers to shift to alternate fuels. In some uses, natural
gas is a technologically superior energy source and would be difficult to replace regardless of the
time available for accomplishing the substitution.
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served by a relatively large number of pipelines (for example, New
York).2 3 Competition among natural gas pipelines and competition
between natural gas and substitute fuels blunts the edge of natural mo-
nopoly by pipelines but does not eliminate the need for regulation. 4
Pipelines obtain natural gas by signing long-term contracts with
producers (typically for terms of ten to twenty years). Until the late
1960's gas was generally available. The gas shortage took the form of
a deficiency of reserves relative to production,25 and regulation resulted
in prices on new contracts that were not much different from prices on
earlier contracts. In the late 1960's, however, reports that some pipe-
lines were experiencing difficulty securing long-term contracts at regu-
lated prices began to surface.26 In the early 1970's serious shortages
began to materialize and it was recognized that ceiling prices were at
faulty.2  As a result of these developments, regulatory authorities per-
mitted several sizable price adjustments on contracts for newly discov-
ered gas.28 As a consequence there has been a substantial and widening
disparity between the average price of natural gas at the wellhead and
the marginal rate on new contracts. In 1975 the marginal price was
three and one-half times the average price.29 This marked difference in
price, however, is not visible to final users or even to local distribution
firms because the FPC regulates pipelines in such a fashion that prices
to local distributors are an average of new and old contract prices.30
Local distribution is the final stage in the natural gas industry.
Distribution takes place through local natural gas utilities which
purchase gas from pipelines at wholesale prices set by the FPC and
23. J. MULHOLLAND & D. WEBBINK, ECONOMIC REPORT: CONCENTRATION LEVELS AND
TRENDS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 166 app. A (1974).
24. The rationale for regulating natural monopoly is straightforward. Since one firm is the
most efficient way of supplying the market, see note 20 supra, competition cannot be relied upon
to generate the results normally associated with competitive free markets. The natural monopo-
list will have the power to raise price and restrict output. The monopolist may also have the
power to regulate the quality of service and to discriminate in terms of price, service, or both.
The regulation of natural monopoly typically focuses on prices, profits and the quality of service.




28. See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
29. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, GAS FACTS 1975, at 110 (1975).
30. This practice is known as "rolling-in" and has become an essential feature of natural gas
policy in the 1970's. Under the rolling-in policy, interstate pipelines sell gas to local distributors
at a price, exclusive of transport cost, just equal to its average cost. Since natural gas prices have
risen substantially, the rolled-in cost is substantially lower than marginal cost. See R. MANCKE,
THE FAILURE OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY 119-31 (1974).
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deliver it to residential, commercial and industrial users at retail prices
regulated by state utility commissions. There is a strong element of
natural monopoly at the local distribution stage. Because there is virtu-
ally no vertical integration of pipelines into local distribution, it might
seem that the problems of monopoly and regulation at the local distri-
bution stage could be easily separated from the natural gas shortages
and the regional distortions caused by FPC wellhead price control and
curtailment policies. Such a separation would have been logical and
valid before the harsh winter and severe shortages of 1976-1977. At
the present time, however, the designation and creation of "emergency
gas"" and the development of local allocation policies with respect to
this gas require that regulatory distribution policies at the local level be
considered in any discussion of the regional distortions caused by the
regulation of the natural gas industry.
B. Competitive Potential
There is general agreement among economists who have studied
the matter in depth that, in the absence of regulation, the natural gas
industry at the exploration and production stage would behave in a
fashion analogous to a competitive32 increasing-cost industry.33 In
fact, effective competition in energy markets was characteristic of the
1950's and 1960's. The structural characteristics of the natural gas in-
dustry led to workable competition between gas producers in both the
interstate and intrastate markets.34 Additionally, natural gas was in
sharp competition with other fuels both in residential and industrial
markets. Some significant imperfections in energy markets did ex-
ist-most notably in the form of import quotas on foreign petroleum
and monopoly elements in the transmission and local distribution of
natural gas. On the whole, however, natural gas, petroleum and coal
sought to capture many of the same markets and competitive free en-
terprise predominated.36
31. See text accompanying notes 141-60 infra.
32. See, e.g., L. COOKENBOO, JR., COMPETITION IN THE FIELD MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS
(1958); P. MAcAvoY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS 4 (1962); E. MITCHELL, U.S.
ENERGY POLICY: A PRIMER 53-54 (1974); E. NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY (1960).
33. An increasing cost industry is defined as one in which additional output can be produced
only at an increasing per-unit cost. Since natural gas is a fossil fuel, the quantity available for
discovery and exploitation is fixed. The gas most easily discovered has already been developed.
New reserves are more difficult and costly to locate and develop.
34. P. GARFIELD & W. LovEIoY, supra note 21, at 321-22.
35. Id. at 315.
36. Competition between natural gas and coal has manifested itself outside the marketplace
as representatives of the coal industry have often intervened in FPC hearings concerning pipeline
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II. CREATING THE SHORTAGE
A. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin
The beginning of the current shortage of natural gas in the United
States is generally traced37 to the Supreme Court's decision in Philis
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin." Phillps arose as an appeal by the State
of Wisconsin from an FPC decision that the Commission did not
have jurisdiction, under the Natural Gas Act of 1938,40 to regulate the
rates at which independent natural gas producers sold to interstate
pipeline companies. The FPC decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Com-
mission did have this authority,4' and the Supreme Court affirmed.4"
The issue faced by the Court was whether an independent pro-
ducer of natural gas was a "natural gas company" and, therefore, sub-
ject to FPC regulation under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act.43
Section 4 authorizes the Commission to regulate "rates and charges
made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas company for or in
connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission."" The Act defines "natural-gas com-
pany" as "a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in in-
terstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for
resale."145 There seemed to be little question that if these were the only
relevant provisions, Phillips Petroleum Company, the independent pro-
ducer, would have fallen within the scope of FPC authority.46 The
problem area was found in section l(b), the general jurisdictional sec-
tion of the Act, which provides that the Act
shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate com-
merce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for
ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or
rate structures. The coal industry has consistently opposed changes that would enable natural gas
to compete more effectively in industrial fuel markets. Id. at 315-16.
37. See, e.g., Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 7; MacAvoy, supra note 6.
38. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
39. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
41. Wisconsin v. FPC, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
42. 347 U.S. at 685.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1976).
44. Id. § 717c(a).
45. Id. § 717a(6).
46. The sale was a sale in interstate commerce whether or not the gas crossed the state line
prior to being sold to the interstate pipeline. 347 U.S. at 677 (citing Interstate Natural Gas Co. v.
FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 687-89 (1947)).
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any other use, and to natural gas companies engaged in such trans-
portation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or
sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the
facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering
of natural gas.47
Phillips Petroleum Company and the FPC agreed that an in-
dependent producer of natural gas fell within the exemptions found in
the latter half of this provision.48 Specifically, Phillips contended that
its sales were a part of the "production and gathering" process and not
subject to FPC regulation.49
The Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument, placing primary
reliance on its earlier decision in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC
50
In Interstate the Court had held that sales made by natural gas produc-
ers to pipeline companies with markets in other states were not within
the section 1(b) production and gathering exclusion.' According to the
Interstate Court, once the sale to the pipeline company was consum-
mated, the production and gathering process was completed." Petition-
ers in Phillips attempted to distinguish Interstate on the basis of the
affiliation of the producer-sellers in Interstate with an interstate pipe-
line and the absence of such an affiliation in their own case. 3 The
Court in Phillps, however, noted that the interstate pipeline affiliation
in Interstate was not a decisive factor. Instead, its earlier decision was
based "on the broader ground that sales in interstate commerce for re-
sale by producers to interstate pipelines do not come within the 'pro-
duction or gathering' exemption. 54 Justice Minton, writing for the
majority, stressed that the exceptions in section l(b) were to be "strictly
construed"55 and that the production and gathering exemption ex-
tended only to the "physical activities, facilities, and properties used in
the production and gathering of natural gas."56
The Court also noted that the legislative history of the Act indi-
cated that its enactment represented an attempt by Congress to plug the
gaps in the regulation of natural gas left by a series of decisions holding
47. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
48. 347 U.S. at 677.
49. Id.
50. 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
51. Id. at 692.
52. Id.
53. 347 U.S. at 680-81.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 679 (quoting Interstate Natural Gas v. FPC, 331 U.S. at 691).
56. Id. at 678 (citing Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 342 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1945)).
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state regulatory measures to be unconstitutional. 7 Taking a broad
view of the goals of Congress the Court concluded:
Regulation of the sales in interstate commerce for resale made
by a so-called independent natural-gas producer is not essentially
different from regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate of
an interstate pipeline company. In both cases, the rates charged may
have a direct and substantial effect on the price paid by the ultimate
consumers. Protection of consumers against exploitation at the
hands of natural-gas companies was the primary aim of the Natural
Gas Act.58
B. Price Ceilings
Immediately after Phi/lips, the FPC issued orders governing the
filing of rate schedules 9 by independent producers and requiring them
to apply for certificates of public convenience and necessity.6" The in-
crease in the workload of the FPC was massive. For the twelve year
period prior to Phillps, the Commission had received a total of 1,244
applications for certificates. In the year immediately after Phillps,
there were over 6,000 applications. Prior to Phillps the Commission
processed an average of 700 gas rate filings per year. In the one year
period after Phillps, the Commission received not only 709 filings from
interstate pipeline companies, but an additional 11,000 filings from in-
dependent producers.62 While the Commission initially attempted to
deal with this regulatory burden by reviewing each rate on the tradi-
tional cost of service basis, as early as 1956 it included in its Annual
57. Id. at 682-83. These decisions held that natural gas moving in interstate commerce was
beyond the scope of state regulation. See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm'n. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec.
Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
58. 347U.S. at685. The Court also took note of several unsuccessful attempts by legislators
to amend the Act to specifically exempt natural gas producers from federal regulation and refused
to bring about the same result "by a strained interpretation of the existing statutory language." Id.
In response to Phillis , producers of natural gas mounted an intensive lobbying effort aimed at
passage of a bill exempting them from coverage of the Natural Gas Act. This campaign was
successful in Congress, but the bill was vetoed by President Eisenhower. See Kitch, Regulation of
the Field Market of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J.L. & ECON. 243, 256
(1968). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas contended that the legislative history of the Act
was not helpful because independent producers were not even considered in the hearings and
debates prior to passage. 347 U.S. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a persuasive argument
that the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act provides very little support for the majority
opinion in Phllps, see Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956).
59. Order No. 174-A, 13 F.P.C. 1255 (1954), appeal dismissed, Magnolia Petroleum Corp. v.
FPC, 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
60. Id.
61. 35 F.P.C. ANN. REP. 87 (1955); see Collole, General Considerations-A Nation's Natural
Gas Pains, 44 GEO. L.J. 555, 559-60 (1956).
62. 35 F.P.C. ANN. REP. 108 (1955).
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Report a recommendation that the Natural Gas Act "be amended to
provide for ... a standard for pricing or evaluating natural gas as a
commodity which would not require use of a rate base or traditional
utility ratemaking principles. 63
The requested legislative relief was not forthcoming, and in 1960
the Commission announced its intention to deviate from the considera-
tion of individual producer rates in favor of establishment of ceiling
rates for areas encompassing several producers.6 1 In December 1960
proceedings were instituted to determine the just and reasonable area-
wide rate for producers in the Permian Basin area.6 5 The Commission
cited both the increased administrative burden brought on by Phillps
66
and the unworkability of the cost of service method of rate evaluation
as reasons for this change. 67 The outcome of this extensive investiga-
tion by the agency was the issuance, in 1965, of a decision prescribing
area-wide price ceilings, based on composite cost data, for Permian Ba-
sin producers. 8
The pricing scheme designed by the Commission called for a sys-
tem of dual prices. One area maximum price was established for natu-
ral gas produced from wells dedicated to interstate commerce after
January 1, 1961. A lower rate was established for all other gas pro-
duced in the area 9.6 Thus, while the advent of area price ceilings had
within it the seeds from which future shortages were to grow, the Com-
mission clearly was cognizant of the possible impact of price ceilings
and attempted to use price as an incentive for exploration and
production.
In 1968, the Supreme Court sustained the use of area-wide price
ceilings in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.7" The Court found that
the Commission had not exceeded its statutory or constitutional au-
thority7" and that the actual rates were within the "zone of reasonable-
ness." 72 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, noted that natural gas
63. 36 F.P.C. ANN. REP. 19 (1956).
64. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
65. Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
66. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
67. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 542-46 (1960), citedin Statement of General Pol-
icy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 819, 819 (1960).
68. Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965).
69. Id. at 185-88.
70. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
71. Id. at 768-90.
72. Id. at 790-813; see FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942), cited in
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 767, 797.
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producers were not amenable to the typical cost of service rate-making
schemes applied in other areas.73 Accordingly, he observed:
Producers of natural gas cannot be usefully classified as public utili-
ties. They enjoy no franchise or guaranteed areas of service. They
are intensely competitive vendors of a wasting commodity they have
acquired only by costly and unrewarded search. . . .The value to
the public of the services they perform is measured by the quantity
and character of the natural gas they produce and not by the re-
sources they have expended in its search. .. .
In addition to recognizing the difficulties involved in the applica-
tion of a rigid cost of service technique of rate determination, the Court
also gave its approval to a dual rate scheme designed to encourage fu-
ture supplies." In this context, Justice Harlan noted, "The Commission
may, within this zone [of reasonableness], employ price functionally in
order to achieve relevant regulatory purposes; it may, in particular,
take fully into account the probable consequences of a given price level
for future programs of exploration and production.
76
C The Current Shortage- The OPEC Effect
As already noted, in the period prior to 1970, any shortages in-
duced by price ceilings were quite small primarily due to the unrespon-
siveness of both supply and demand to prices set below the unregulated
level.77 In the early years of natural gas regulation retail prices of gas
often declined due to economies of scale in transportation and competi-
tion with other fuels.78 Problems began to appear, however, in the late
1960's and early 1970's. First, the Clean Air Act of 196719 induced
massive shifts in energy consumption from coal to oil and gas.8" Sec-
ond, the OPEC nations began to exert market power over the world
price of crude petroleum. The Arab oil boycott and subsequent cartel
action resulted in a 350% increase in world oil prices in a short period
73. 390 U.S. at 756.
74. Id. at 756-57. The Court also noted the massive increase in workload that resulted from
its opinion in Phillpos. Id. at 758.
75. Id. at 796-97.
76. Id. at 797.
77. MacAvoy, supra note 6, at 168. See also Kahn, Economic Issues in Regulating the Field
Price of Natural Gas, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 504 (1960), cited in MacAvoy, supra note 6, at 168 n.3.
78. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 21, at 299.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
80. Krutilla & Page, Energy Policyfrom an Environmental Perspective, in ENERGY SUPPLY
AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 76 (R. Kalter & W. Vogely eds. 1976). See also J. MADDOX, BEYOND
THE ENERGY CRisis 91-92 (1975).
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of time." FPC controls on natural gas restrained prices at a level that
made it a tremendous bargain relative to petroleum fuels. The dispar-
ity in the price of natural gas relative to substitute fuels induced a se-
vere shortfall in natural gas.82
Not all of the effects of the controls have been bad. Some groups
have benefited enormously. Economic rents have been extracted from
gas producers and passed on to natural gas users in the form of con-
sumer surplus. In nontechnical but less accurate terms, real income
has been transferred from gas producers to gas users.8 3 Another major
beneficiary group has been OPEC. The shortfall in natural gas caused
an artificial increase in the demand for substitute fuels including petro-
leum, petroleum gases, liquefied natural gas and synthetic gases. The
OPEC nations are a major source of supply of these natural gas substi-
tutes. The controls on the domestic petroleum industry channeled
much of this increase in demand for natural gas substitutes directly to
OPEC. As a result, imports rose and OPEC benefited.8 4
The price differential between petroleum and natural gas reveals
something about the impact of OPEC on the natural gas industry. In
the absence of regulation, the price of natural gas would tend to gravi-
tate to an equilibrium price per BTU energy equivalent comparable to
that of petroleum. Owing to the technological and environmental su-
periorities of one fuel over the other, strict parity is unlikely; the differ-
ences, however, would not be sizable. This implies that in the absence
of regulation the price of natural gas would be considerably higher.8 5
81. T. TIETENBERG, ENERGY PLANNING AND POLICY 26 (1976).
82. The growth in the shortage was rapid. See R. MANCKE, SQUEAKING BY: U.S. ENERGY
POLICY SINCE THE EMBARGO 10 (1976).
83. In an unregulated competitive market, price will adjust to be the cost of production of
the highest cost producer of natural gas. Those producers with highly productive gas wells and
low costs receive a return that economists call economic rent. By holding prices below the market
clearing level, rents are reduced and passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Thus,
the real income of gas producers is lowered and the real income of consumers is raised. See R.
MANCKE, supra note 30, at 48-55.
84. It is well established that the domestic energy policy adopted largely in response to
OPEC has had the effect of shifting demand from domestic energy to imports. Much of the
imported energy comes from OPEC countries. The entitlements program is the primary reason
for this ironic result. See Hall & Pindyck, The Contlicting Goals of National Energy Policy PUB.
INTEREST, Spring 1977, at 3, 4-5.
85. Prior to 1976, natural gas was estimated to be selling for less than one-third the price of a
comparable BTU of a close substitute, residual fuel oil. T. TIETENBERO, supra note 81, at 136
n.7. The rise in the ceiling price of newly discovered gas to $ 1.42, see text accompanying notes
86-94 infra, eliminated much of this disparity. This increase, however, still left the relative price of
natural gas below substitute fuels. See Revised Ratesfor New Natural Gas- Hearings Before the
Special Subcomm. on Oil and Natural Gas Production and Distribution of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1976) (statement of A.V. Jones); Federal Power Commission
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The FPC and the courts 6 have not ignored the OPEC effect. In
mid-1974, the Commission instituted a uniform national rate for sales
of natural gas produced from wells commenced on or after January 1,
1973, and new dedications of natural gas to interstate commerce on or
after the same date.87 The new national rate of forty-two cents per
thousand cubic feet (Mcf) was from 20 to 110% higher than the area-
wide rates it replaced. 8 On an energy equivalent basis, however, these
price increases were far less than OPEC petroleum price rises.89 Six
months after the adoption of a nationwide rate, a twenty percent price
increase to fifty cents per Mcf was approved.90 In July 1976, the Com-
mission approved an increase in the base price of new dedications to
$1.42 per Mcf.91 While the price increases on new gas from 1974
through 1976 have been great, they still have not eliminated the dispar-
ity in the prices of natural gas and substitute fuels 92 and, consequently,
shortages persist.
It deserves emphasis that the higher uniform national rates do not
apply to all natural gas but only to new dedications. "New gas" trades
at one price and "old gas" at another. Actually, a multi-tiered pricing
system now exists. Gas newly sold on the interstate market (after Jan-
uary 1, 1975) has a base rate of $1.42 per Mcf. Gas discovered or
committed between January 1, 1973, and January 1, 1975, has a base of
93 cents per Mcf and "old gas," discovered or committed prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1973, sells for 29.5 cents per Mcf.93 Most of the gas flowing into
the interstate network is old gas.94 Consequently, the rolled-in price is
substantially below the $1.42 rate on newly discovered gas.
The problem that continues to plague the Commission is one of
reconciling the short-run interests of consumers in lower prices with
Biennial Rate Decision: Opinion No. 770: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gation ofthe House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
87. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974).
88. Calculations by authors from data in id. at 2281.
89. See note 85 supra.
90. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974).
The 50 cent ceiling actually provided a base for further increases. The Commission approved
automatic increases of one cent per Mcf per year. 1d. at 1649.
91. Opinion No. 770, 10 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-293 (1976). The base of
$1.42 is permitted to increase at the rate of one cent per Mcf per quarter.
92. See note 85 supra.
93. 18 C.F.R. § 2.56a, b (1977).
94. Revised Rates/or New Natural Gas: Hearings Be/ore the Special Subcomm. on Oil and
Natural Gas Production and Distribution ofthe Senate Comm on Commerce, supra note 85, at 67.
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their long-term interests in increased production. In a statement ac-
companying its 1974 order establishing the forty-two cent national rate
the Commission described its quandary:
[T]he continuing and deepening natural gas shortage and critical
shortages of other energy sources which have resulted in a national
energy emergency requires that this Commission take all prudent
steps to insure that the rates allowed for natural gas sold in interstate
commerce are adequate to bring forth the requisite supplies to fulfill
reasonable demand while protecting the "consumers against ex-
ploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies." Thus, the Com-
mission faces a formidable task; establishing rates high enough to
provide the economic incentive for the unprecedented task of finding
enormous volumes of new gas but not so high that the natural gas
consumer is exploited during the time of shortage.95
III. ADMINISTERING THE SHORTAGE
A. FPC Authority
Having abandoned price as a rationing mechanism, the FPC was
faced with the task of determining who would receive the increasingly
scarce supplies of natural gas. On April 15, 1971, the Commission is-
sued Order No. 43196 directing natural gas pipeline companies to de-
velop and file plans for curtailing deliveries of gas. In the order, the
Commission offered its guidelines on how the plans should be struc-
tured and which users should be deemed highest priority.97 More im-
portant at this time, however, was the question whether the FPC was
authorized to apply its curtailment standards to direct sales of natural
gas to final users. As was noted earlier, the Commission's authority in
the area of rates extends only to gas sold for resale. The critical issue
was whether the Commission's curtailment authority extended beyond
its authority to regulate prices. This question was answered in the af-
firmative in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.9g
Louisiana Power and Light Company was a direct customer of
United Gas Pipe Line Company (United). United's curtailment plan
did not distinguish between customers buying for resale and those
95. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212, 2217-18
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
96. 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971).
97. Id. at 572.
98. 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
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purchasing for direct consumption. 9 Louisiana Power and Light ob-
jected to the plan, arguing that, under section l(b) of the Natural Gas
Act, its status as a direct customer prohibited the FPC from directing
curtailment of its gas deliveries.' " Section 1(b), it will be recalled, is
the general jurisdictional provision of the Act, which extends FPC au-
thority to "the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to
the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption. . . and to natural gas companies engaged in such
transportation or sale." '' The final proviso of the section adds that
jurisdiction "shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of
natural gas." 102 Louisiana Power and Light argued that sales to direct
customers were exempt under this latter proviso.103 A unanimous
Court, relying on the legislative history of the Act" and its 1947 de-
cision in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service
Commission,10 rejected this interpretation of section 1(b).106 The Court
viewed section 1(b) as providing for three independent areas of FPC
jurisdiction, including " '(1) the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3)
natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.' "107 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that while "the Act's application to
'sales' is limited to sales of interstate gas for resale, the Act applies to
interstate 'transportation' regardless of whether the gas is ultimately
sold retail or wholesale."'' 0 8
Having dispensed with the problem of jurisdiction, the Court ap-
proved the equal treatment of direct and resale customers, citing sec-
tion 4(b) of the Act.'09 Section 4(b) is the substantive provision of the
Act that is applicable to curtailment plans and directs:
No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or
sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1)
make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or
99. Id. at 627.
100. Id. at 625.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976).
102. Id.
103. 406 U.S. at 637.
104. 406 U.S. at 639-41.
105. 332 U.S. 507 (1947), cited in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. at 636-37
n.13.
106. 406 U.S. at 647.
107. Id. at 637 n.13 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S.
at 516).
108. Id. at 636 (citing FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 468 (1950)).
109. Id at 642-43.
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subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2)
maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facil-
ities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as be-
tween classes of service.1
B. Curtailment Standards
After issuing its initial curtailment guidelines in 1971, the Com-
mission approved far more detailed priority guidelines in 1973.111 The
most recent policy statement of the Commission with respect to curtail-
ment priorities is found in Order No. 467-C, I 2 which lists the following
nine priority-of-service categories:
(I) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(2) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak
day), firm industrial requirements for plant protection, feed
stock and process needs, and pipeline customer storage injection
requirements.
(3) All industrial requirements not specified in (2), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), or (9).
(4) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than
3,000 Mcf per day, but more than 1,500 per day, where alternate
fuel capacities can meet such requirements.
(5) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3,000 Mcf or
more Mcf per day) boiler fuel use where alternate fuel capaci-
ties can meet such requirements.
(6) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but
less than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capacities can
meet such requirements.
(7) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500
Mcf per day through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel
capacities can meet such requirements.
(8) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but
less than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capacities can
meet such requirements.
(9) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf per day,
110. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (b) (1976).
111. Order No. 467 was issued in 1973, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973). It was followed by Order No.
467-A, 49 F.P.C. 217 (1973), and Order No. 467-B, 49 F.P.C. 583 (1973). Pipeline companies are
required to file their curtailment plans with the FERC. While the plan is being reviewed, the
company and their customers normally negotiate an interim plan designed, as one author has
described it, "to spread the misery as equitably as possible." Muys, Federal Power Commission
Allocation of Natural Gas Shortages.- Proration, Priorities and Perfplexity, 20 RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 301, 309 (1975).
112. 51 F.P.C. 1199 (1974). Order No. 467-C includes the same priorities as Order No. 467-
B, 49 F.P.C. 583 (1973). It also includes a policy statement concerning relief from curtailment.
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where alternate fuel capacities can meet such requirements. 113
The FPC regulations group direct and indirect customers 1 4 together
and require full curtailment at each level before beginning curtailment
at the next higher level.I" The Commission permits petitions for relief,
however, under section 1.7(b) of its Rules of Practice and Procedure,
and under extraordinary circumstances these priorities may be al-
tered. 16 The Commission has expressly rejected pro rata curtail-
ments" 7  and curtailments based on preshortage contractual
obligations." 8 With respect to the latter the Commission has observed:
We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end use rather
than on the basis of contract supply simply because contracts do not
necessarily serve the public interest requirement of efficient alloca-
tion of this wasting resource .... [Plerformance of a firm contract to
deliver gas for an inferior use, at the expense of reduced deliveries
for priority uses, is not compatible with consumer protection." 9
Initially the list seems to encompass two themes. First, there is a
strong end-use emphasis with the Commission regarding gas for
human use and for small commercial consumers as highest priority. 20
The second theme appears to emphasize the distinction between "firm"
service customers,'' those contracting for an uninterrupted supply of
113. 51 F.P.C. at 1200. Process uses are those in which the use of other fuels is not techni-
cally feasible. These uses require the precise temperature control and flame characteristics of gas.
Gas is employed as a raw material in feedstock uses. Plant protection uses are those in which gas
is necessary to prevent harm to personnel or facilities.
114. This has also led to jurisdictional questions. The Supreme Court decision in Louisiana
Power & Light appears to go no further than to affirm the authority of the FPC to treat direct
customers and those purchasing for resale similarly vis-a-vis curtailments. Order No. 467, 49
F.P.C. 85 (1973), goes further than this and extends curtailment regulations to indirect customers
(ie., those purchasing from resale customers). The power of the Commission to group direct and
indirect customers together has been challenged and was upheld in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally Tiano, The Limits of Federal Regulation of
Natural Gas Curtailments, 64 GEo. L.J. 27 (1975).
115. 51 F.P.C. at 1200-01.
116. Id. at 1200.
117. See, e.g., Transcontinental Pipeline Corp., 10 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-
1045, 5-1089 (1976). Under a pro rata curtailment plan, if a pipeline suffers a 10% shortfall, each
customer would receive 10% less than the contractual entitlement. Muys, supra note 111, at 305.
118. See, e.g., Arkansas La. Gas Co., 49 F.P.C. 53 (1973), remandedforfurther consideration
sub nom. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 933 (1976).
119. Id. at 66.
120. End-use has been approved as a proper differentiating factor. See American Smelting
& Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925, 935-36, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
121. "Firm" service is defined by the FPC as "service from schedules or contracts under
which a seller is expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes within a given time period and
which anticipates no interruption, but may permit unexpected interruption in case the supply to
higher priority customers is threatened." Arkansas La. Gas Co., 49 F.P.C. 907, 911-12, remanded
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gas, and "interruptible" service customers, 122 those enjoying a lower
rate at the risk of service interruptions. In fact, this emphasis on the
firm-interruptible distinction has curtailment on the basis of end-use as
its goal. In using this distinction to determine priorities, the Commis-
sion was clearly under the impression that customers contracting on an
interruptible basis were more likely to have alternate sources of fuel
and less likely to use fuel for human needs or nonsubstitutable indus-
trial service than consumers contracting for an uninterruptible sup-
ply. 23 The Commission has noted that "[t]he value of the 'firm-
interruptible' contract distinction as a curtailment standard is . . .
largely dependent upon the accuracy with which it reflects the intensity
of a purchaser's need for gas."' 24
In practice the firm-interruptible distinction has been a rather poor
indicator of the intensity of need. This was particularly clear soon af-
ter issuance of Order No. 467 in proceedings involving the filing of a
permanent curtailment plan by the El Paso Natural Gas Company. 125
The efficacy of the firm-interruptible distinction as an end-use indicator
was seriously hampered because many of the industrial customers of
the pipeline were located in California and the California Public Utili-
ties Commission required all industrial contracts in excess of 200 Mcf
per day to be interruptible. Customers outside of California were not
subject to the same requirement. 126 Thus, under the nine category plan,
consumers with identical uses would be assigned to different priority
levels. In order to avoid this effect the Commission approved a five
stage plan that eliminated the firm-interruptible distinction.' 27  Ac-
cording to the Commission: "factual conditions . . . persuade us that
the Commission's overriding policy of curtailment based on end-use
would be contravened should the priority formula of Order No. 467-B,
and the 'firm-interruptible' contract distinction embodied therein, be
imposed on the El Paso system."'128  It is noteworthy, however, that the
forfurther consideration sub noma. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
122. "Interruptible" service is defined by the FPC as "[s]ervice from schedules or contracts
under which seller is not expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes within a given time pe-
riod, and which anticipates and permits interruption on short notice." Id. at 912.
123. Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85, 86 (1973).
124. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 51 F.P.C. 2053, 2059 (1974).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2058.
127. Id. at 2060-61.
128. Id. at 2058. In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Moody notes that interruptible




Commission still entertained high hopes for the firm-interruptible
distinction. In its decision it cautioned that its actions "should not per-
mit the inference that [it] is abandoning [the] position that interruptible
uses should be subject to curtailment ahead of all other uses."' 12 9
The inconsistency of priorities based on the firm-interruptible dis-
tinction with those based on end-use was even more evident in pro-
ceedings involving an interim curtailment plan submitted by
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco).130 The suit, at
the appellate level, involved a dispute between the FPC and groups of
natural gas consumers over what type of interim plan would remain in
effect prior to approval of a permanent plan. The plan submitted by
Transco and favored by the Commission was modeled after Order No.
467 and included the firm-interruptible distinction.13 ' In rejecting the
467 plan the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
cited the severity of its impact on those consuming for human pur-
poses. 3 2 A summary of this impact was presented by Piedmont Natural
Gas Corporation, an intervenor in the suit:
"During the 1974-75 winter, Piedmont will lose 37.81% of gas cur-
rently being sold to customers in Order No. 467-B's category 2. As a
result, Piedmont will be forced to completely curtail services to 31
hospitals, three water pumping plants serving the entire city of
Greensboro, North Carolina, a city with a population of approxi-
mately 180,000, four sewage treatment facilities, three nursing
homes, two state boarding schools for the physically handicapped,
and one state prison. Although these customers have historically
purchased gas under 'interruptible' rate schedules, the majority of
these customers have historically been curtailed only a few days each
year. As a result, most of these essential public service institutions
do not have, nor can they readily obtain, sufficient alternate fuel ca-
pacities to permit them to offer uninterrupted service if they are com-
pletely curtailed by Piedmont." '133
The problems inherent in the firm-interruptible distinction were
also brought out in the 1976 opinion of the Commission establishing a
[I]f one class of customers has historically paid a higher price in return for the apparent
guarantee of preference in gas service, while other customers have paid a lower price in
recognition of the pipeline's acknowledged right to interrupt that service, the quid has
been paid and it is time for us to put the pro quo into the transaction.
Id. at 2080 (dissenting opinion).
129. Id. at 2060.
130. Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 377.
132. Id. at 379-80.
133. Id. (quoting Affidavit of Earl C. Chambers, Senior Vice President of Piedmont Natural
Gas Corporation at 13-14).
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permanent curtailment plan for the Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. 34
In its opinion the Commission accepted the conclusion of Administra-
tive Law Judge Zimmet that the firm-interruptible distinction should
be eliminated.'35 According to Judge Zimmet the dichotomy was based
on the assumptions that (1) interruptible service connotes inferior end-
uses, (2) interruptible customers have alternate fuel sources, and (3)
interruptible customers pay less than firm customers.' 36 In fact, none of
the assumptions was valid. First, many of the industrial customers us-
ing gas for feedstock, process and plant protection purposes were on
interruptible contracts. Second, the types of interruptions anticipated
were to be of short duration during periods of extremely cold weather.
Thus, any alternate fuel supplies that had been developed were not ad-
equate to compensate for expected long-term curtailments. Finally,
the rates paid by direct interruptible customers were equal to or in ex-
cess of those paid by firm customers buying for resale.'
37
While the Commission has not formally abandoned the firm-inter-
ruptible distinction, its unreliability as an indicator of end-use, 38 and
the requirement that the validity of the dichotomy as a means of deter-
mining end-use be supported by substantial evidence, 139 have caused
this element of FPC curtailment policy to be deemphasized. As a re-
sult of this deemphasis, the lower four priority-of-service categories of
Order No. 467-C have, in effect, been eliminated and the remaining
five end-use categories determine the order of curtailment. 140
C Emergency Gas
The growing shortages of natural gas in the 1970's led gas pipe-
lines, local distribution utilities and some industrial users to seek un-
regulated gas to replace the regulated interstate gas that was no longer
available in adequate quantities. Replacement gas is available from a
number of sources and at various prices. The replacement gases are of
134. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 9 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-652 (1976).
135. Id. at 5-668.
136. Id. at 5-667. The rationale for favoring firm customers because of the higher rates they
have paid is that they have, in effect, paid the higher costs of the capacity necessary to serve them
during periods of peak demand. Interruptible customers have, on the other hand, opted to avoid
the costs of peak demand capacity.
137. Id.
138. See Transcontinental Pipeline Corp., 10 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-1045,
5-1089-90 (1976).
139. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
140. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 9 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-652
(1976); El Paso Natural Gas Co., 51 F.P.C. 2053 (1974).
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two basic types-supplemental gas and emergency gas. The primary
supplemental gases include liquified natural gas, synthetic natural gas
and liquid propane gas. 4' Emergency gas is gas purchased in the
unregulated intrastate market and shipped interstate for distribution in
areas suffering from severe shortages. The demand for supplemental
and emergency gas is sensitive to adverse weather conditions, especially
to cold temperatures.'42 Emergency and supplemental gases are avail-
able only at prices considerably in excess of regulated interstate
prices. 4
3
There are basically two types of emergency gas-that purchased at
the initiative of curtailed industrial users and that purchased at the ini-
tiative of a pipeline company or local distributor for resale. The for-
mer type was sanctioned in 1975 by Order No. 533. 4" Prior to 1973
any final user could purchase gas in the unregulated intrastate market.
Order No. 533 permits interstate shipment of such gas as long as the
purchasers, whether firm or interruptible, are using the gas for priority
2 purposes.' 45 The second type of emergency gas is authorized under
section 2.68 of the Commission's General Policy and Interpretations. 146
This type of emergency gas can be purchased for resale but is only
available for a period not in excess of sixty days. 147
The need for emergency and supplemental gas is a direct conse-
quence of the natural gas shortage. Since the shortages have had dif-
ferential impacts among the states, 148 there have been widely varying
141. Another source of supplemental gas under active consideration is gasified coal. See
Cicchetti & Weiner, The End-User Pricing ofNatural Gas, 101 PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 16, 1978,
at 11, 11-12.
142. The reason for this is that the demand for natural gas peaks during periods of extremely
cold weather. This increases the shortage of natural gas and results in an increase in the demand
for substitutes.
143. Supplemental gases are available for prices ranging from $3.50 to $5.00 per Mcf.
Cicchetti & Weiner, supra note 141, at 12. Emergency gas is priced at the most attractive price at
which it can be obtained by purchasers in intrastate markets. In August 1976 the intrastate price
in Texas, the largest producing state, was $1.78 per Mcf. FederalPower Commission Biennial Rate
Decision, Opinion No. 770: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 85, at 29 (statement of R. Dun-
ham). The intrastate price indicates the approximate price at which emergency gas could be
obtained. The intrastate price in August 1976 of $1.78 per Mcf was about 25% higher than the
$1.42 ceiling price on new gas. The rolled-in average price of old and new gas was about 39 cents.
Thus, emergency gas was actually about four times as costly as the rolled-in average cost. Id. at
18 (statement of Rep. R. Krueger).
144. 18 C.F.R. § 2.79 (1977).
145. Id. See generally Comment, FP. C. Order 533 and the Natural Gas Shortage-Too
Little, Too Late, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 653 (1976).
146. 18 C.F.R. § 2.68 (1977). See also td. §§ 157.22, .29.
147. Id. § 2.68.
148. See text accompanying notes 162-75 infra.
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needs for emergency gas. State policies with respect to the pricing and
allocation of emergency gas are generally set by utility commissions
and are subject to rapid modification as circumstances change.
In June 1977 a survey of supplemental and emergency gas pricing
policies by the National Association of Railway and Utility Commis-
sions (NARUC) revealed that twenty-one states had adopted formal
pricing policies with respect to emergency gas purchased for resale. 149
Eleven states had policies with respect to synthetic natural gas, seven-
teen states with respect to liquid natural gas and nineteen states with
respect to liquid propane gas.1 50 The predominant form of policy was
one of rolling-in the higher priced unregulated gases with the regulated
gas; this was especially true for supplemental gas. 15 1 Eight states
priced some emergency gas on an incremental basis, charging the spe-
cific end user of the gas full cost of the emergency gas. Indiana priced
emergency gas incrementally to industrial users and Wisconsin re-
ported in the NARUC survey that it only priced incrementally. 52
North Carolina reported a hybrid policy. In the winter of 1976-1977
the majority of the excess cost of emergency gas was rolled-in to non-
residential customers, with residential customers sharing the excess cost
only for the amount of emergency gas required to serve residential cus-
tomers.' 53 North Carolina, however, began fully rolling-in emergency
gas in the summer of 1977.114 Of course, gas purchased directly by
final users as authorized by Order No. 533 is only available at the full
incremental price of intrastate gas.
Evidence now accumulating suggests that there has been an abuse
of emergency gas purchases.' 55 Some pipelines are using emergency
gas on an essentially continuing basis to supply low priority users;15 6
some unregulated intrastate suppliers have become virtual quasi-per-
manent sellers of emergency gas in the interstate market. 57 Since the
price of this gas is generally rolled-in, in terms of 467-C priorities, the
149. Report to Gas Subcommittee of the National Association of Railway and Utility Com-






155. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: EMER-
GENCY GAS PURCHASES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO CORRECT PROGRAM ABUSES AND CONSUMER IN-
EQUITIES, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. i-vi (1978).
156. Id. at 11, 15-19.
157. Id. at 9-10.
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high priority users can be regarded as subsidizing the low priority
users.15 With these abuses in mind, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission recently issued a notice that it will review emergency gas
policies and will adopt a formal rule clarifying the policy in the fall of
1978. 159
Like curtailments, emergency gas is a result of the natural gas
shortage. Its flow diminishes the shortage and may correct some of the
distortions in regional allocations discussed below. To the extent this
occurs, however, regional distortions in prices via the rolling-in of
emergency gas also occur. 160  Although emergency gas relieves some of
the pressures created by severe curtailments, the variety of uncoordi-
nated state and local pricing and allocation schemes are equally likely
to perpetuate the problems brought on by federal regulation.
IV. ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES OF PRESENT CURTAILMENT
POLICIES
A. Administrative Allocation and Economic Theory
Administratively allocating a limited natural gas supply in an effi-
cient and equitable manner is a truly Herculean task. According to
economic theory an unregulated market would be both efficient and
impersonal. In such a market, energy prices would adjust to those
levels that would lead rational decisionmakers to choose the fuel that
would be best for them given the technology of energy consumption,
the risks associated with fuel availability, and the array of prices for
substitute fuels. After all adjustments take place, natural gas would be
allocated to those consumers and into those uses in which its value is
the greatest.
In contrast to a free market for natural gas, any administrative
allocation plan, including 467-C, will, according to traditional theory,
be arbitrary in the sense that some uses of natural gas will be effectively
158. Id. at 9.
159. Policy Examination of 60-Day Emergency Natural Gas Programs: Request for Com-
ments, Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n No. RM78-7, at 17 (Apr. 7, 1978).
160. The prices and availabilities of gas in North Carolina and Georgia are good indicators
of this differential impact. Both of these states have been affected by curtailments. North Caro-
lina purchased massive volumes of emergency gas during the winter of 1977-1978 in order to serve
priority 1 customers. Georgia, with a serious but less severe problem, was estimated to have a
rolled-in cost of approximately $1A0 per Mcf. States with less serious curtailments would be
purchasing smaller quantities of emergency gas and, consequently, would have lower rolled-in
costs. Interview with Ray Nery, Director of the Natural Gas Division of the Public Staff of the
North Carolina Utilities Commission, in Raleigh, N.C., (April 24, 1978).
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prohibited on a basis other than willingness and ability to pay. Ad-
ministrative allocation will also be personal in that individuals rather
than the market must select which willing buyers receive natural gas
and which do not. Finally, an administratively determined allocation
plan may be inefficient for a number of reasons. First, the initial allo-
cation plan may fail to establish efficient priorities that direct the flow
of natural gas into those uses having the highest value to society. Sec-
ond, the adoption of an allocation plan creates incentives that lead
decisionmakers to modify their behavior in order to move up the prior-
ity list or to avoid the allocative restrictions altogether. Third, as a
dynamic economy changes the efficient utilization of natural gas must
evolve with it. An administratively determined allocation scheme,
whatever its initial merits, may not contain the incentives for modifying
natural gas use in light of changing circumstances. In fact, by giving
preferential treatment to some users, the administrative allocation plan
creates vested interests that may act as an impediment to changing the
policies regulating and controlling the natural gas industry. Fourth,
natural gas is a fossil fuel and there is a maximum quantity available
for ultimate use; consequently, the relative scarcity of natural gas is
likely to increase over time.' 6' The unregulated market contains incen-
tives encouraging innovation in socially desirable directions. The mar-
ket stimulates private decisionmakers to voluntarily direct invention
and innovation into the conservation of resources that are becoming
increasingly scarce. An administrative allocation plan retards these
market incentives and thus contributes to a waste of natural gas in the
long run. Finally, even if an allocation plan itself is designed to avoid
these problems, the question of how the plan fares in actual practice
remains. For example, even if the existing scheme for allocating natu-
ral gas has an efficient set of priorities, the gas may not flow evenly
across the country into the designated priority uses.
This latter problem of theory versus implementation is particularly
significant because it does not involve the risks of the normative judg-
ments typically involved in areas of federal regulation. One may ar-
gue endlessly about the merits of the rankings system and the
161. This does not mean that supplies of natural gas offered for sale are absolutely fixed and
unresponsive to price. The percentage change in quantity supplied in response to a percentage
change in price is what economists call price elasticity. The value of elasticity has important
implications for natural gas policy. The exact value of this elasticity is not known. There are
pessimistic and optimistic estimates. See R. MANCKE, supra note 30, at 110. One estimate that
does not appear to be unduly optimistic or pessimistic is an elasticity of .51. This means that a
10% price increase would result in a 5.1% increase in natural gas reserves. See also Breyer &
MacAvoy, supra note 7, at 946.
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desirability of low prices in the short-run versus increased long-run
supplies. Once an allocation program has been formulated, however,
one purely objective consideration remains: Has the program been
effectively implemented? In the case of natural gas the answer is an
unequivocal "no."
B. Order No. 467-C in Practice: A Case of Regional Distortions
In practice, implementation of Order No. 467-C, as modified by
subsequent Commission decisions, has led to serious and unintended
regional variations in the curtailments of the interstate shipments of
regulated gas. The FPC in November 1976 estimated that the curtail-
ments for the heating season of 1976-1977 ranged from a low of zero
for several states to more than sixty percent of requirements for South
Carolina.'62 A similar estimate for the 1977-1978 heating season re-
vealed curtailments ranging from zero to more than sixty-six percent. 163
While the curtailments by themselves do not measure the severity of
the natural gas shortage, 164 they are indicative of the regional dispari-
ties in the availability of regulated interstate gas. The differences in
curtailments among the states cannot be explained in terms of the end-
use priorities established by 467-C type curtailment plans. 165  Some
states are curtailing high priority users and other states are continuing
to serve low priority users. 166  In January 1977 priority 1 users (resi-
dential and small commercial) were being curtailed in those sections of
the country most affected by the shortage, 67 while at the same time in
the West and upper Midwest, practically all users were being served. 68
162. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROJECTED NATURAL GAS CURTAILMENTS AND POTENTIAL
NEEDS FOR ADDITIONAL ALTERNATE FUELS: 1977-1978 HEATING SEASON 15 table 2 (1977).
163. Id. at 31-41.
164. The basic curtailment statistic is curtailed gas as a percentage of requirements. The
curtailment statistic does not show what priority is being curtailed nor does it make any reference
to the availability of alternate fuels.
165. There are variations in end-uses among the states. Those with severe curtailments may
be curtailing high priority users while those experiencing little or no curtailment are servicing all
users. Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1977) (statement of James R. Schlesinger) [hereinafter cited as Emergency Natural Gas Act.
Hearings].
166. As early as 1975 North Carolina was curtailing practically all industrial use of gas. See
Natural Gas Shortage: Hearings on H.A 2418 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1975) (statement of
Frank Zarb).




The allocation scheme has failed when residential and small commer-
cial users in one section of the country cannot get all the gas they need
while large industrial users with alternate fuel capability are burning
natural gas as a boiler fuel in other parts of the country.
How can regional disparities and distortions occur when the FPC
has set up an elaborate curtailment system that favors high priority
users? The reason is relatively simple. Even though the Commission
regulates prices of interstate gas with a uniform national wellhead price
and has an elaborate set of curtailments applicable presumably on a
nationwide basis, it does not attempt to ration the nation's supply of
natural gas in the interstate market. The 467-C plan is on a pipeline-
by-pipeline basis. The gas of each pipeline is allocated in accordance
with approved curtailment plans, but the pipelines vary widely in terms
of the gas they have available to meet customer demand. By no means
are all interstate pipelines able to meet the same percentage of contract
demand. In the heating season of 1975-1976 (November 1 through
March 1), the projected weighted average national curtailment of all
interstate pipelines was just under nineteen percent.' 69 Two large pipe-
lines, Texas Eastern and Transcontinental (serving the east coast and
terminating in New York), had projected curtailments of twenty-three
and thirty-six percent, respectively,170 while two other pipelines, South-
ern Natural Gas and Pacific Gas Transmission, had none. 171 In the
winter of 1976-1977 five of the thirty largest pipelines accounted for
fifty-seven percent of all the nation's projected curtailments.172
There are a number of reasons for the wide disparity in curtail-
ments between pipelines. The primary source of supply of interstate
gas is the long-term contracts between pipeline companies and natural
gas producers for gas in a particular field. 173 Optimistic and farsighted
pipeline companies bought extra reserves when they were available in
the 1960's. The truly incisive ones vertically integrated into offshore
natural gas production at an early date. The pipeline companies with
serious curtailments today did not sign contracts for extra reserves in
the 1960's, did not vertically integrate into offshore production, and
169. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT' UNITED STATES CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF




172. Emergency Natural GasAct: Hearings, supra note 165, at 10.
173. The contracts usually run for 15 to 20 years. See generally P. MACAVoY, PRICE FOR-
MATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS 29-30 (1962).
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were unlucky enough to have substantial contracts with producers in
fields that were exhausted at an unexpectedly early date. The effects of
antipollution laws and OPEC certainly could not be anticipated, and a
strong random element undoubtedly explains much of the disparity in
pipeline curtailments. Regardless of the exact cause of the disparity,
the failure of the FPC to allocate wellhead supplies among pipelines
has significant differential impacts on regional economies.
Although the marked differences in the importance of natural gas
to individual state economies lend an element of arbitrariness to any
system of categorization by states, the magnitude of regional distortion
caused by natural gas regulation is revealed most clearly by analyzing
the impact of the enormous variations in curtailment among the states.
The table below groups states into four categories ranging from those
with extremely severe curtailments to those with slight or no curtail-
ments. 174 The percent of total natural gas curtailed and the percent of
industrial natural gas curtailed are both very important indicators of
the severity of the impact of regulation-induced distortions. Both were
used in classifying states into four categories. In terms of both criteria,
states were ranked from highest curtailments to lowest.
The four categories may be characterized as follows:
Extremely Severe Curtailments:
Included in this category are nine states that ranked in both the
top one-third of states with respect to the percent of total natural
gas curtailed and the top one-third of states with respect to the
percent of industrial natural gas curtailed. Seven of the nine
states meeting these two criteria are in the Southeastern region.
The most severely affected are clearly North and South Carolina.
Natural gas is an important fuel in the economies of all of these
states.
Severe Curtailments:
Included in this category are all states that were either in the top
third with respect to total natural gas curtailments or in the top
third with respect to industrial natural gas curtailments. Thirteen
174. The percentage of total natural gas curtailed, indicated in column 1 of the table, is that
percentage of the total quantity that would have been consumed in the absence of a shortage.
The percentage of industrial natural gas curtailed, column 2 of the table, is that percentage of the
industrial consumption that would have occurred in the absence of a shortage. Column 3 of the
table contains a similar measure for commercial curtailments, and columns 4 and 5 contain two
measures of the importance of natural gas to a state's economy and are suggestive of the impact of
a percentage curtailment on a state.
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175. Table compiled by authors from data in A. BASS, PROJECTED NATURAL GAS CURTAIL-
MENTS AND POTENTIAL NEEDS FOR ADDITIONAL ALTERNATE FUELS: 1977-1978 HEATING
SEASON (U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Information Center, 1977), and L. CRUMP, FUELS AND
ENERGY DATA: UNITED STATES BY STATES AND CENSUS DIVISIONS, 1974 (U.S. Bureau of the
Mines, 1977).
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states are included and they are spread widely across the country.
They tend, however, to be most heavily concentrated in the mid-
section of the country. Natural gas is an important fuel in all of
these states also.
Slight To No Curtailments:
Included in this category are thirteen states that fall into the lower
third of states with respect to both total natural gas curtailments
and industrial natural gas curtailments. Natural gas is an impor-
tant fuel in all of these states except the upper New England states,
where, historically, sparse populations and great distances from
the producing fields made transport costs high. Now that natural
gas is a bargain relative to other fuels, the lack of pipeline capacity
effectively prohibits these states from demanding additional
quantities.
Moderate Curtailments:
Included in this category are twelve states that do not fit into the
other three categories. All of these states fall into the middle third
with respect to total natural gas curtailments or industrial natural
gas curtailments. Eight of the states are in the middle third with
respect to both types of curtailments. Two states, New York and
Connecticut, are in the middle third with respect to industrial nat-
ural gas curtailment but are in the lower third with respect to total
natural gas curtailments. Two other states, New Mexico and
Washington, are in the middle third with respect to total curtail-
ments, but are in the lower third in terms of industrial curtail-
ments. Natural gas is an important fuel in each of these states with
the exception of Connecticut, which shares many characteristics
with its northern New England neighbors.
When price controls were extended to the wellhead and later when
the 467-C end-use plan was adopted there was no intent to single out
one or two states or a region and apply more severe curtailments to
them than to the rest of the nation. But this is exactly what has hap-
pened. The Southeastern region has been the most seriously affected
and North and South Carolina have suffered the most severe curtail-
ments. The special situation of these two states deserves attention. The
table shows that North Caroliuta had 53% of its total natural gas re-
quirements, 86% of industrial natural gas requirements, and 45% of
commercial natural gas requirements curtailed. South Carolina had
corresponding curtailments of 67%, 59% and 12%. The industrial and
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commercial curtailments in North Carolina are the highest in the na-
tion by a wide margin. Moreover, for ten months in 1977 North Caro-
lina was the only state having a policy prohibiting allnew natural gas
hook-ups.'76 South Carolina ranks first among all states in terms of
percentage of total natural gas curtailed, although its situation with re-
spect to industrial and commercial curtailments is not as severe as in
North Carolina.
Why have the Carolinas been so severely affected? The primary
reason is that each state receives major supplies of natural gas from
pipelines with very poor reserve positions.'77 In fact, North Carolina is
supplied by only one pipeline, Transcontinental, which has one of the
worst delivery capabilities of any interstate pipeline. 7 8 The problems
inherent in the pipeline-by-pipeline curtailment policy and the hard-
ships suffered by the states dependent upon pipelines with severely re-
stricted delivery capabilities have been brought to the attention of the
FPC, the FERC, and the courts, with limited success. 17 9
C Economic Impact
The extremely severe curtailments have important long-run impli-
cations for the Carolinas. Both states are relatively poor and have ac-
tive industrial development programs designed to attract diversified
high wage industry. The severe natural gas curtailments adversely af-
fect regional industrial location decisions. North Carolina was one of
176. Rulemaking Proceedings Concerning Load Growth Policies of North Carolina Gas
Distribution Utility Companies, North Carolina Utilities Commission No. G-100, Sub 21, at 4
(Aug. 1977).
177. A pipeline's reserves are determined by the long-term contracts that they have signed
with producers of gas. P. MAcAvoY, supra note 173, at 29.
178. In the winter of 1975-1976 Transco had curtailments of over 35%. Only three other
pipelines had higher curtailments. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CON-
GRESS, supra note 169, at 6.
179. See, e.g, State ex rel Utilities Comm'n v. Farmers Chem. Ass'n, 33 N.C. App. 433, 235
S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 258, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 10 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew-Bender) 5-1045 (1976). But see Consolidated Edison Co.
v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
North Carolina v. FERC, No. 76-2102 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 1978) represents the most recent
and successfull attempt to relieve the misallocation problem. In its opinion the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit rejects the FERC's approval of a curtailment plan submitted
by Transco because the plan did not consider the impact on end-use curtailment objectives result-
ing from differences in the availability of alternative pipeline suppliers among the states. Id slip
op. at 22-26.
The long run impact of the decision is uncertain at this time. It seems likely that some of the
supply distortions will be decreased. Apart from this, however, the deficiency in the current regu-
latory scheme remains: pipelines in poor reserve positions will still be unable to meet demand
and states dependent on these pipelines will continue to suffer from more severe curtailments than
their more fortunate neighbors.
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the first states with serious curtailment problems, and the North Caro-
lina Economic Development Division began to document the adverse
effects of natural gas curtailments in 1973.180 In the four year period
from June 1, 1973, to August 1, 1977, North Carolina was dropped
from consideration for new plant location by thirty-four firms because
of the shortage.' 8' The firms were in high wage industries and had a
potential investment value of almost $500 million and employment po-
tential of over 11,000. They constructed plants in states that could
make natural gas commitments. 82 It is highly probable that addi-
tional undocumented plant location decisions were affected during the
same period and, unquestionably, similar distortions took place in
other states with extremely severe curtailments.
There are other regional distortions induced by natural gas regula-
tion. The first distortion to materialize following the emergence of se-
rious shortages in the early 1970's was the great disparity in prices
between the producing and the nonproducing states.183 The producing
states, chiefly Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana, have historically been
heavy users of natural gas because of the low transport costs. The
overwhelming bulk of the gas consumed in these states is intrastate gas
and not subject to FPC price controls. The effect of restrictive FPC
controls and free markets in intrastate gas has been to create a signifi-
cant price differential between producing and nonproducing states.
The initial effect of the differential probably was to discourage new
industrial locations in the producing states and encourage them in non-
producing states having lower energy prices. The higher prices in the
intrastate market also forced industrial users and residential consumers
to shift to higher priced alternate fuels. Since serious curtailments
under FPC controls have come to affect more and more nonproducing
states, the industrial location disincentives have probably faded-prices
are higher in the producing states, but natural gas is available and in-
dustrial users expect it to continue to be available. In the long run, the
FPC controls give an edge to the producing states, because those states
have relatively freer markets than do the nonproducing states.
180. Testimony of Thomas B. Broughton, Director, Energy Development Division, North




183. The regional disparity in prices occurs as a direct consequence of the dual price system
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
V. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the administrative al-
location of natural gas has been an unmitigated disaster. Allocations
are arbitrary and not in accord with the established priorities, pipelines
have widely varying delivery capabilities, and there are enormous dif-
ferences in curtailments of natural gas among states and regions.
Moreover, the controls have dynamic inefficiencies built into them that
surely retard adjustment to a world in which energy is becoming in-
creasingly scarce. Why do we continue the controls? The shortcom-
ings of regulation are now both obvious and serious and, taking only
economic efficiencies into consideration, there seems to be general
agreement that the gains from complete deregulation outweigh the
costs of continued regulation.'8 4 Despite this, there clearly is no general
agreement that regulation should be entirely eliminated. In consider-
ing the possibility of deregulation, equity considerations intrude and
questions of fairness become at least as important to policymakers as
efficiency.
The major beneficiaries of wellhead regulation have been high pri-
ority users. They have received gas at prices substantially below the
cost of alternate fuels and also below the long-run incremental cost of
natural gas. These high priority users, many of whom are residential
customers, stand to lose substantially from deregulation. Those gaining
from deregulation would include the owners of natural gas wells. It is
widely believed that it would be both unfair and inequitable for resi-
dential users to pay substantially higher prices while natural gas pro-
ducers reap enormous windfall gains in income and wealth.' 35 It is this
concern that is the fundamental barrier to complete deregulation of
natural gas and to development of an economically efficient energy
policy.
What ethical principle of income and wealth distribution should
guide policy with respect to natural gas? Neither economics, political
science, philosophy or ethics provides a nonarbitrary and objective an-
swer. Federal policies with respect to wellhead price controls deter-
mine the winners and losers and make the hard choices involving the
equity and efficiency trade-offs. The equity and efficiency considera-
inherent in intrastate and interstate markets. See generallL. WEISS & A. STRICKLAND, REGULA-
TION: A CASE APPROACH 154-55 (1976).
184. See, e.g., Hall & Pindyck, supra note 84, at 8-10.
185. See, e.g., Heller, Oil and Gas: The Core Issues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1977, at 22, col. 5.
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tions continue to filter through Congress and the policy choice will be
made in the political arena. Charles Schultze noted in his Godwin
lectures at Harvard in 1976 that the American political system has de-
veloped formal and informal rules to govern political decisions that im-
pose direct economic losses on citizens. According to Schultze, the
overriding political principle is: Do No Direct Harm.1 86 Losses can
occur as a consequence of second- and third-order adjustments, caused
by political decisions or through failure to act, but there is an over-
whelming propensity to avoid political decisions that do highly visible
direct harm. In the case of natural gas regulation these secondary and
tertiary effects can deal a devastating blow to the economic health of
the Carolinas and the entire Southeast. Although the "no harm" rule
is not absolute and decisions inflicting direct losses do occur, the rule
clearly continues to play a dominant role on the issue of natural gas
deregulation, thereby avoiding the imposition of unpopular short-run
losses on millions of residential users.
Discussions of the alleged inequities of deregulation of natural gas
usually assume that a system of price ceilings and curtailments is free
of inequities. Clearly, this is not the case. A residential customer in
Texas pays a substantially higher price than a comparable natural gas
consumer in a nonproducing state. Similarly, a neighbor who relies on
natural gas will pay a fuel bill that differs widely from that of an other-
wise identical neighbor who uses fuel oil. A similar inequity exists in
residential electricity compared to natural gas. Deregulation will cre-
ate some inequities but it will eliminate the regulation-induced
inequities identified here.
In entering into the regulation of the field price of natural gas
there was never an intention to create the regional distortions and
inefficiencies described in this article. Traditional economic theory has
maintained, however, that the long-run consequences of ceiling price
regulation in an essentially competitive market will do more harm than
good. The consequences flowing from the regulation and control of
the natural gas industry since Phillos Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin
strongly support the traditional theory.
186. C. SHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 23 (1977).
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